From the European Parliament to interest representation: Limited public-private circulation, but low-key cooperation

The revolving door phenomenon, understood in this article as former members of the European Parliament (MEPs) making a career switch to lobbying, has been the subject of increasing media and political attention over the last twenty years. However, precise data are still lacking on its scale, concrete forms, and driving factors. With this in mind, this article draws on two data sources: statistical data on the post-term career trajectories (including lobbying) of a population of elected representatives—the French delegation to the European Parliament—cross-referenced with interviews conducted with former MEPs and potential recruiters in consultancies and large firms. First, we observe that a move into full-time lobbying after serving as an MEP is a statistically marginal phenomenon. In the qualitative part of the study we then go on to identify a series of explanations that relate to the professional boundaries between political institutions and private/commercial organizations, even in a European space in which these boundaries have a reputation as being more blurred and elastic. Finally, the article shows that such trajectories do however exist, and most importantly, that they are supplemented by various forms of collaboration with interest representation organizations. We seek to identify which MEPs are most likely to engage in these forms of cooperation, and the skills they mobilize to do so.