From the European hemicycle to interest representation: limited public/private flows but low-key cooperation

The revolving door phenomenon, understood here as the reconversion of former MEPs into jobs linked to lobbying, has been the subject of increasing media and political attention over the last twenty years, without it yet being easy to objectify its weight, concrete forms and factors. With this in mind, the article draws on a double survey: statistical data on the post-mandate futures (including lobbying) of a population of elected representatives – the French delegation to the EP – cross-referenced with interviews conducted with former MPs and potential recruiters in cabinets and large firms. Firstly, we observe that the occupation of full-time lobbying positions after a term of office is a statistically marginal phenomenon. The qualitative survey then goes on to identify a series of explanations referring to the professional boundaries between political institutions and private/commercial organizations, even in a European space that is reputed to be more blurred and more plastic. Finally, the article shows that such trajectories do exist, and that, above all, they are supplemented by various forms of collaboration with interest representation structures, which we seek to identify which MPs are more inclined to engage in, and what skills they commit to them.